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THE MAKING OF SOCIAL 
THEORY
Abstract: ! is article analyzes the
practice of making social theory in terms
of the changing styles manifested in
writing social theory texts. It is claimed 
that, taken generally, “writing” social 
theory has not moved beyond its most 
widespread form of being an exercise
in the systematic treatment of the phe-
nomena under study rather than being 
a  genuine problem-solving activity. As
demonstrated on selected historical 
examples of “writing” social theory, it 
seems evident that there is no standard 
form or style of “making” social theory 
apart from commentary. And that social 
theory, unlike related styles of academic 
writing, uses “commentary” not as a part 
of the argument being elaborated, but as
a  standard and routine way of making 
knowledge claims. It is argued here that 
commentary is not the basic method 
only in the contemporary and largely 
educational and instructive forms of 
social theory, but also in the supposedly 
original achievements of the # eld’s lead-
ing # gures. ! e argument elaborated 
here suggests that the inability to ar-
rive at a  standard form of “making” 
social theory may be a  consequence of 
individual, authentic, original, creative
thinking drawing its inspiration from
sources that are heavily derivative and 
sometimes permeated by very chaotic 
and strenuous e$ orts to demonstrate the
coherence of the thinking that it some
way refers to the social world.
Keywords: social theory styles of 
writing commentary interpretation
canon social knowledge
Jak se dělají sociální teorie
Abstrakt: Tato studie se zaměřuje 
na  způsoby, jakými se standardně 
vytváří sociální teorie, a  to především 
z  hlediska proměn stylů psaní textů. 
Tvrdí se zde, že celkově vzato způsoby 
psaní využívané v  rámci sociální teorie 
jsou navzdory proklamacím spíše cviče-
ním v  systematickém uchopování zkou-
maných jevů než akademicky vyzrálou 
činností usilující o  řešení problémů. 
Na  několika vybraných historických 
příkladech „psaní“ sociální teorie je uká-
záno, že neexistuje žádná standardní 
forma vytváření sociální teorie, jež by 
překračovala stádium „komentáře“. 
Na rozdíl od  jiných stylů akademického 
psaní sociální teorie nepoužívá „ko-
mentář“ jako součást rozvíjení určité 
argumentace, nýbrž jako standardní 
a  rutinní způsob vznášení poznávacích 
nároků. Komentář přitom není výchozí 
metodou pouze v  současných z  velké 
části edukačních a instruktážních podo-
bách sociální teorie, zakládá také způsob 
práce vůdčích představitelů této oblasti, 
jejichž příspěvky jsou současnými sociál-
ními teoretiky považovány za originální 
a  hodné důkladné interpretace. Zde 
rozpracovaná argumentace naznačuje, 
že neschopnost dospět ke  standardní 
podobě „vytváření“ sociální teorie je dů-
sledkem skutečnosti, že je inspirace pro 
individuální, autentické, originální či 
kreativní myšlení čerpána ze zdrojů, jež 
jsou prostoupeny nepůvodností a  často 
také velmi chaotickou a úpornou snahou 
prokázat koherenci myšlení, jež se ur-
čitým způsobem vztahuje k  sociálnímu 
světu.
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 kánon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Given the number of monographs, textbooks, guides, anthologies and read-
ers on the subject, social theory seems to be one of the most prosperous 
branches within the social sciences. As is evident in “standard” social theory 
texts, “social theory” is usually presented not as a continuous research activ-
ity pursued in collaboration among social scientists, but rather as an under-
taking stimulated by a growing market for social science students on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, as a chance to overcome, and escape from, the 
limitations imposed by more meticulous disciplinary approaches. Although 
it is by no means self-evident that there is a clear distinction between, for 
example, political, psychological, sociological, or even economic theory, 
“social theory”, at least in its recent forms, is by de" nition understood as 
an interdisciplinary activity with no clearly speci" ed research agenda.1 It
is o# en claimed that, unlike the “standard” form of summarizing accounts 
that attempts to introduce, organize and capture the basic line of social 
theory’s historical development, most o# en exempli" ed by selected leading 
" gures, paradigms, schools or intellectual movements, the making of social 
theory in its original and non-derivative form seems to lack any stabilized 
pattern. In textbooks, anthologies and readers, it is customary to assign 
a  few intellectual authorities to every formative period of social theory’s 
development, nevertheless the history of social theory is constantly being 
rewritten in any new textbook, anthology or a reader. $ e canon of social 
theory is always open to revision, whether in terms of new interpretations 
of the founding " gures and the formative periods, or in relation to the latest 
discoveries and " ndings, and, especially, in relation to the newly emerging 
fashions. $ e historically shaped format, layout and project of social theory 
1  As Stephen P. Turner argues in a  recent text describing the role of social theory within 
contemporary academic culture: “Social theory is ordinarily not thought of as autonomous 
academic " eld, a genuine and complete academic identity, or as an appropriate, or feasible, 
academic career choice, or as much more than an amorphous publishing category for books 
that are nonempirical, not strongly identi" ed with a discipline, which make some ‘social’ ref-
erence. Sociologists typically think of it as the theoretical side of the discipline of sociology or 
as a sub" eld of sociology, thus a secondary identity that is submerged in, and subordinate to, 
the primary identity of ‘sociologist.’ Non-sociologists think of it as a kind of supradisciplinary 
collection of themes traditionally associated with sociology or with le# -wing politics, and now 
associated with cultural studies and feminism.” Stephen P. TURNER, “$ e Maturity of Social 
$ eory.” In: CAMIC, C. – JOAS, H. (eds.), ! e Dialogical Turn: New Roles for Sociology in the
Postdisciplinary Age. New York: Rowman & Little" eld 2004, p. 141 (141–171).
$ is article was written as part of the research project: “Contemporary Approaches in 
Historical Epistemology” (grant no. P401/11/2338), funded by the Czech Science Foundation.
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suggests that every single manifestation of social theory “in the making” 
is to be interpreted and accepted as an expression of the author’s personal 
intention, and not as the result of any pressure from within the discipline it-
self, as might be the case with respect to the particular practices required by 
sociological, political, psychological, or anthropological theory. ! e making 
of social theory, by contrast, seems to be, or at least claims to be, permissive 
towards associative, non-prescriptive, heterogeneous and una" ected styles 
of writing, with only a few rather auxiliary requirements, such as the use of 
attractive explanatory diction that can appeal to the public and the promise 
of enrichment through reading.
To sum up, with a slight exaggeration, at the core of the enigmatic charm 
and seductive force of social theory is the fact that it seems to have no other 
assignments and objectives apart from the very task of making sense of social 
theory’s relevance. Given that its main e" ort is directed at the reconstruc-
tion of the past, and that its main object is to understand the past intellectual 
achievements of selected $ gures, schools or traditions, social theory is by its 
very nature a reductionist, arbitrary, imperialistic, or even, some might say, 
an imperious enterprise. ! e notions and projections of the unifying canon, 
founding $ gures, and emergent traditions, imparting an image of coher-
ence and compactness always within reach of any new assemblage of social 
theory, provide the introductory narratives with the dynamics necessary to 
make an appealing promise to organize something that, as is historically 
documented, has always de$ ed orderliness. In his book analyzing the debates 
about the “founders, classics, canons” of the sociological tradition, Peter 
Baehr distinguishes between the discursive and the institutional founding 
of the discipline. He argues that “in the case of institutional founding, the 
criteria of validation are empirical and, in principle straightforward.”2 In
terms of discursive founding, which had commonly been thought to be the 
agenda of social theory – also conceived of as a discourse with its own crite-
ria of validation –, the situation is much more complicated:
! e origins, coordinates and authority of a discourse are a matter of insoluble 
controversy there are no accepted criteria that can de$ nitely settle the issues
they raise. Or to put it in more technical terms, the criteria of validation for 
discourse are aporitic, which is to say, intrinsically open-ended, endlessly hy-
pothetical and contestable >...@ this inherently equivocal and uncertain property 
2 Peter R. BAEHR, Founders, Classics, Canons: Modern Disputes Over the Origins and 
Appraisal of Sociology’s Heritage. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2002, p. 8.
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of discourse reveals itself in >...@ the dissensus that surrounds: which concept or 
theme in the founder’s discourse is the central one which intellectual tradition
the founder’s work is closest to who the ! rst “real” sociologist was and what 
kind of break with the past founding entails. It is important to stress that the 
aporitic quality of discourse is not supposed to re" ect an ontological di# erence 
between discourses and institutions such that the former are deemed to be less 
real, material, substantial than the latter. Rather, the aporia of discourse rests 
on the fact that discourse can only be known through, and has no animation 
without, the categories and interests of interpretative communities: and these 
are constantly in " ux.3
$ is absence of accepted criteria of validation renders social theory an 
ever searching, non-disciplined style of writing that adapts its explanatory 
tasks to the permeable structure of its agenda. As Richard Rorty very compre-
hensibly demonstrated in his famous text “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing”,4
philosophers, although they commonly act as if they were developing and 
cultivating great ideas and solving great problems, tend, to a much greater
extent than what corresponds to claims about the originality of one’s think-
ing, to adopt and reproduce certain historically conditioned ways and styles 
of writing. And by acquiring them they prove their professional competence 
and demonstrate their intellectual authority. If we accept Rorty’s view of the
matter, various traditions, schools and intellectual movements appear to be
divergent not so much in terms of their ideological foundations, cognitive
interests, and theoretical or methodological claims, but rather in terms of 
the preferred forms, styles and ways of “writing” texts. If researchers under-
stood this, the ideological disputes commonly regarded as the real triggers 
of various “wars between schools” would lose their overriding signi! cance 
in historical interpretations of the development of individual disciplines.
$ is is not just about ideas and how they are articulated, which testify to the
historical context of particular scienti! c disciplines’ devolved, it is also about
the ways in which we are allowed to investigate and write about such ideas.
$ e element of “adapting” to standard practice is of crucial importance,
since particular scienti! c disciplines have forti! ed their borders not only by 
de! ning their subject matter, but also by de! ning acceptable writing styles,
as is clearly evidenced in two fundamental forms of scienti! c “writing”: in 
the academically more rigorous style of “writing” journal articles, or in the 
3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Richard RORTY, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida.” New Literary 
History, vol. 10, 1978, no. 1, pp. 141–160.
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more individualized, formally more detached and creative style of “writing” 
monographs. Of course, the styles of writing governed by practices within 
a given discipline provide evidence of the scienti" c maturity and the level 
of uni" cation within the given discipline, and scienti" c practice suggests 
that the more progressive disciplines are those that are able to eliminate, as 
consistently as possible, non-standard ways of “writing”, and, at least in their 
mainstream production, reject any alternatives. By the logic of this argu-
ment, scientists prove their originality by demonstrating how “uniquely” 
they are able to adapt to the standard practice.
In their most transparent form, these insights are particularly relevant 
for disciplines with no " xed way of writing, a prime example of which is 
social theory. It would be very di#  cult to challenge its e$ ect on shaping 
various social sciences. From an institutional perspective, social theory is 
currently a generally accepted, specialized activity that is relatively " rmly 
established in academic structures: it has many publishing channels in the 
form of prestigious journals and monograph series published by major pub-
lishing houses,5 and its educational curriculum is surprisingly uniform.6 Yet 
in terms of its discursive founding, its existence is still somewhat precarious 
or chronically unclear, not only in terms of the scienti" c relevance of its 
production, but also in terms of the standards that govern the “writing” of 
academic texts in this " eld. % is is so regardless of the fact that hardly any 
other research area has put such a systematic e$ ort into clarifying what it is 
founded on. To sum up, without much exaggeration, the enormous amount 
of texts striving to answer the question, what is social theory, may arouse 
the impression that the very subject matter of social theory is to de" ne itself, 
what it could be, how to arrive at that, and how to adapt to the process of get-
ting there. Unfortunately, o& en the " rst and insurmountable barrier turns 
out to be that it is impossible to agree not only on whether there is such 
a thing as social theory, but also on whether there ever was such a thing as
5 % e fascination of the leading publishing houses with “social theory” seems endless. Each 
year brings new accounts and interpretations of this area’s history, subject matter, founders 
or more recent " gures from Sage, Routledge, Blackwell and other leaders in the “textbook” 
market.
6  % e teaching curriculum, as Peter Baehr claims, “is the key institutional mechanism” and 
the word “canon” is crucial for the battle “over the university and college curricula. % is battle 
encompasses such issues as how best to teach the ‘great books’ or ‘classic texts’ of the social 
sciences, which of them to teach, whether they should be taught at all, >...@ and whether the 
prestige accorded to them is defensible or desirable in a late modern, ethically plural, gender-
conscious, economically and politically divided social world.” BAEHR, Founders, Classics,
Canons, p. 151.
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social theory, such that we would wish to give evidence of its embodiment. 
! e history of social theory, like the history of philosophy, about which 
Alfred N. Whitehead said that it “is a series of footnotes to Plato,” suggests 
that the main problem may not lie in the disintegration of its subject matter 
or its discursive content, but rather in the lack of clarity in and the recur-
ring opacity and derivativeness of its way of “writing.” Although the whole 
existence of social theory as a # eld of study seems to rest on the assumption 
of the originality and distinctiveness of its founding # gures, it is much more 
the case, as Stephen P. Turner puts it, that “social theory is primarily com-
mentary >... and commentary@ is the most common form of writing in social 
theory.”7 He further claims:
! e great thinkers in the canon, Weber and Durkheim and Marx, and including 
Parsons and Habermas at the next level, wrote works that were almost entirely 
commentary and conceptual improvement and revision. Even such a  text as 
Durkheim’s Suicide has virtually no original content as distinct from com-
mentary >...@ Weber’s writings are almost entirely commentary as well. If we
do not recognize them as such, it is because he did not identify very explicitly 
the sources on which he is commenting, and typically we are not aware of them. 
But usually they are easy to identify and Weber’s original contribution is clear. 
Weber of course had a kind of general system of categories into which the texts 
he commented on were reinterpreted, and this gave the material a great deal 
of coherence. But what he says is nevertheless commentary, though, as with 
Durkheim, it is commentary on # gures who are not as great in retrospect as he.8
! us, contrary to the widespread conviction promoted in the self-
legitimizing diction of social theory textbooks, anthologies and readers, 
claiming that the inevitable task of “making” social theory is to elucidate 
original, enigmatic and o$ en impenetrable ideas of past # gures, social 
theory can be revealed to have functioned through commentary since its 
very beginning in those founding texts now retrospectively considered the 
epitomes of sheer individual creativity, inspiration or imagination. It follows 
that, unlike related styles of academic writing, social theory uses “commen-
tary” not as a part of the argument being elaborated, but as a standard and 
routine way of making knowledge claims. ! e work of the founding # gures, 
especially in terms of social theory’s agenda, forms probably the only real, 
undisputed and tangible research material in the # eld, regardless of whether 
7  TURNER,! e Maturity of Social ! eory, p. 156–157.
8 Ibid., p. 157.
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the signi! cance of those ! gures is being elevated or refuted, for instance, 
in contemporary approaches highlighting the oppressive character of social 
theory’s “white” and “masculine” history. " ere is not much doubt about the 
fact that the disciplines authorities have been conceived of and presented as 
the main source of inspiration for subsequent generations of social theorists, 
and that their treatment has been crucial in forming a style of “writing” typi-
cal of social theory up to the present. In terms of social theory’s production, 
the number of texts “writing” about theory/theories certainly exceeds the
number of texts that at least claim to be articulating a certain theory. " e 
interplay between a  social theorist’s original contribution, the derivative-
ness of that original contribution and its appropriation by the social theory 
agenda can be clearly exempli! ed in one of the most important theoretical 
books in this ! eld, Talcott Parsons’ ! e Structure of Social Action, which for 
a long time set the standard for theoretical work in the social sciences. " is 
book, as Charles Camic puts it:
By virtue of its sweep, its determination to take a single, bold line of argument 
and to work it out with regard to issue a$ er issue, Structure is a great specimen 
of the theoretical logic of sociology in operation. In coming to understand this 
book, one comes to understand not only the views that one theorist put forth 
but also something about the manner in which a theorist reasons, about what 
underlies a  particular form of theoretical reasoning, and about the critical 
limitations of that form.9
 At the same time, however, from a di% erent point of view this book 
was ! rst and foremost a  structured summary elaborating on the work of 
Parsons’ predecessors10 with the primary intention of revise their ideas. 
And it may be the case that the continuing appeal of Parsons’ synthesis for 
social theory lies much less in the supposed originality of his e% ort than in 
the promise of a  systematic revision of the past and commentary on past 
achievements, all with the prospect of creating new foundations. As Camic 
admits, theorists and students of theory have been drawn to the book again 
and again, “though generally without coming into terms with the vast body 
9 Charles CAMIC, “Structure A$ er 50 Years: " e Anatomy of a Charter.” American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 95, 1989, no. 1, p. 94 (38–107).
10 See also Charles CAMIC, “Reputation and Predecessor Selection: Parsons and the 
Institutionalists.” American Sociological Review, vol. 54, 1992, no. 4, pp. 421–445; Je% rey C.
ALEXANDER – Giuseppe SCIORTINO, “On Choosing One’s Own Intellectual Predecessors: 
" e Reductionism of Camic’s Treatment of Parsons and the Institutionalists.” Sociological 
! eory, vol. 14, 1996, no. 2, pp. 154–171.
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of piecemeal commentary that has accompanied the volume’s rise to classic 
status.”11 Interpretations, revisions, summaries and especially commentaries 
thus have become dominant tools employed to make and write social theory, 
which ordinarily tend to reproduce in just a di" erent conceptual rendition 
those same divergences or negative or residual categories, as Parsons would 
have put it, that lead past social theories to a dead end. Because the mate-
rial on which generic social theory is based and explored is limited to just 
a small number of authors – to avoid endless disputes it would be possible to 
agree on only a few dozen canonical # gures in social theory –, it is evident 
that also the texts, which are composed in the form of interpretations of 
certain interpretations, accounts of certain accounts, revisions of certain 
revisions, summaries of certain summaries, have been essential in form-
ing the academic style of writing that predominates in social theory. And 
it also seems plausible, if we follow the logic of the above-stated argument 
that commentary is the basic method not only in contemporary and largely 
educational and instructive forms of social theory, but also in the suppos-
edly original achievements of the # eld’s leading # gures, that the inability to 
arrive at a standard form of “making” social theory may be a consequence of 
inspiration for individual, authentic, original, insightful, creative thinking 
being drawn from sources that are heavily derivative and sometimes perme-
ated by very chaotic and strenuous e" orts to demonstrate the coherence of 
the thinking that it some way refers to the social world.
$ e image of coherence has been recurrently enlivened in social theory’s 
agenda in attempts to substantiate a conceptual pro# le of various historical 
forms of social theory, be it its classical, modern or contemporary version. 
When it was not possible to document the existence of substantive theo-
retical achievements,12 conceptual analysis promised to be the appropriate 
means of organizing divergent insights elaborated by individual thinkers. 
Historically taken, social theory relied on the possibility to set up unclut-
tered relations between concepts, as it continually strived to elaborate a co-
herent conceptual scheme and repeatedly addressed the (correspondence/
non-correspondence) problem of the relation between concepts and reality. 
$ e fact that conceptual analysis was then an undisputed prerequisite of 
analytical scienti# c work also seemed to promote the knowledge claims 
11 Ibid.
12  $ is point was highlighted by Robert K. Merton: “We have many concepts but fewer con-
# rmed theories many points of view but fewer theorems many ‘approaches’ but fewer arriv-
als.” Robert K. MERTON, Social ! eory and Social Structure. New York: $ e Free Press 1968, 
p. 52.
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steadily contained in modern forms of “making” social theory. ! e ad-
equacy of social theories belonging to the classical and modern period was 
assessed through the criteria of the logical consistency and the orderliness of 
the concepts employed in various attempts to conceptualize the logic of so-
ciety’s development. Social theory tried to adapt and process many concepts 
in order to link them together and use them as building blocks of a theory 
of society. A great part of its production prior to the so-called “postmod-
ern turn” in social theory, which to a  large extent dismissed the very idea 
of all-embracing concepts and conceptual schemes, in fact worked on the 
presumption that if we manage to arrange and link together those concepts 
by means of which we are capturing social phenomena, then we will also 
be able to organize and hold society together. To put it succinctly, without 
attempts to arrange concepts there would be no society, at least in the form 
it is conceived by theorists, and without transformations of concepts, there 
would be no history of social theory. ! e very idea of a conceptual scheme 
can also be seen as an expression of the conviction that the “war between 
schools” can be overcome and that divergent theoretical and conceptual ap-
proaches can be squeezed into one comprehensive frame of reference. What 
was also of crucial importance in forming modern social theory, was the 
overall conviction that it is possible to interconnect in a systematic manner 
the many concepts historically accumulated in the area of social theory, and, 
principally, that it is possible to sort them out, to delimit them and decide 
which of these concepts belong to this area and which ones do not.
! is self-interpretation of social theory’s mission was dramatically 
challenged in the late 1960s when the promise of scienti# c relevance was 
replaced with the promise of public relevance. Social theory became a base 
camp of politicized radical alternatives rejecting the concept of professional 
social science. New meanings became attached to the “social theory” label. 
Also its agenda was transformed beyond recognition and new concepts came 
into prominence. ! e new “disobedient” generation13 refused to di$ erentiate
between academic and popular styles of writing, or, to put it more precisely, 
13  ! e autobiographic memories of eminent social theorists who studied in the 1960s and were 
active in the “new” theoretical movements can be found in Alan SICA – Stephen TURNER 
(eds.), ! e Disobedient Generation: Social ! eorists in the Sixties. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 2005. ! is book provides a highly valuable insight into this period of a great 
generational change within the social sciences, as it o$ ers, as the editors claim in the preface, 
“a ‘class portrait’ of those who lived through a cultural and political period of history which 
was fraught with anxiety, even danger, and that virtually pushed these scholars into sociology 
and social theory, sometimes even against their will.” Ibid., p. xiii.
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between scienti! c and public relevance. It drew inspiration and referred to 
di" erent intellectual sources, distinctly deviating from “mainstream” pro-
duction. Books such as Orrin E. Klapp’s Heroes, Villans and Fools (1962), 
Howard Becker’s Outsiders (1963), Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man
(1964), or Richard Sennet’s! e Fall of Public Man (1967), represented a real 
alternative to the required university reading of the generation of postwar 
“baby boomers,” keeping alive the promise of social analysis sensitive to ur-
gent social problems, which itself played a major role in individual choices to 
study the social sciences. If every new strident theoretical community strives 
to create its own “canon,” then this generation tended to follow the exam-
ples of texts that, as Herbert J. Gans put it, “share this common objective to 
study >...@ society at large in an interdisciplinary manner.”14 Social theory’s
method of “interpretive” commentary employed in attempts to reconstruct 
the preceding theories, ideas, concepts, has been largely renounced in favor 
of more engaged political and moral commentary. It was becoming more 
and more evident that the desirable outcome of social theory was not the 
reconstruction or renewal of some type of thought, but rather the renuncia-
tion of the previous would-be scienti! c approach to social reality and the 
replacement of the project of uni! ed theory by political and moral analysis, 
which appeared to harbor the only possibility of restoring social bonds 
with the public. As summarized historically by Steven Seidman and Je" rey 
Alexander:
In the 1970s, theory textbooks were dominated by discussions of disciplinary 
crises. Con$ ict theory, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and 
exchange theory were presented as alternative paradigms for resolving the 
crisis and building a new and more adequate social science. In the 1980s as 
the specter of Parsonian domination receded into distant memory, such polar-
izing and fragmented discourses no longer dominated theoretical conscious-
ness, even if they remained in the rei! ed structures of textbook life. % ey gave 
way to grand e" orts at theoretical synthesis, while much less empiricist, more 
explicitly philosophical, and much less narrowly tied to speci! c disciplines, re-
mained closely connected to the project of providing an e" ective framework for 
a universalizing social science. Debates about structure and agency, expressive 
and strategic action, positivism and post-positivism were the order of the day. 
% ese debates seem decidedly less relevant to the contemporary scene. While it 
14  Herbert J. GANS, “Best-Sellers by Sociologists: An Explanatory Study.” Contemporary 
Sociology, vol. 26, 1997, no. 2, p. 133 (131–135).
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is not certainly the case that these analytical concerns have been resolved, the 
conversation about them has assumed an entirely di! erent form. " e language 
of contemporary social theory has dramatically changed. " e scienti# c project 
has been abandoned, not only in theory but also in some of the most in$ uential 
empirical research. Not only has the disciplinary focus disappeared, but there 
has also been a marked shi&  away from the ambitions of a speci# cally social 
science.15
A great number of programmatic texts in the late 1980s and in the 1990s 
repeatedly pointed out the signi# cant shi&  in social theory’s discursive 
identity and also the thorough transformation of its agenda.16 " e rise of 
postcolonial, multicultural, feminist, postructuralist and other rhetorically 
very cogent approaches17 seemed to constitute a  radical departure from 
social theory’s traditional commitments. It was claimed that a  historical 
chance had opened up for social theorists to adopt a new role allowing them 
to reveal what had so far been repressed, that is the heated and authentic in-
terest in contemporary social and moral problems. And, of course, this was 
15 Steven SEIDMAN – Je! rey C. ALEXANDER, “Introduction.” In: SEIDMAN, S. – 
ALEXANDER, J. C. (eds.), ! e New Social ! eory Reader: Contemporary Debates. London: 
Routledge 2001, p. 2 (1–29).
16  " e early 1980s brought new incentives also for social theory’s more traditional project 
to elaborate a general and systematic theory of society. " e work of social scientists such as 
Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Je! rey Alexander, Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu 
and others seemed to promise a new founding of social thought. It also solidi# ed the standard 
style of writing in social theory, which was entirely derived from “commentary”, given that 
the work of these prominent # gures immediately became the object of immense interpretative 
activities within the community of social theorists, as it is evidenced by the enormous number 
of articles concerned with their theories in professional journals in the 1980s. Although books 
such as ! eory of Communicative Action, Systems ! eory, Structuration ! eory, ! eoretical 
Logic in Sociology, themselves also almost entirely dependent on “commentary” (with the 
possible exception of Niklas Luhmann), raised great hopes of revitalization of theoretical 
thinking, these expectations were rather short-lived in terms of reinforcing more solid inter-
disciplinary identity. In consequence, these grand theories – soon becoming classics in their 
own right – were absorbed as ritual objects of standard and routine practice within social 
theory. Despite the fact that, from an analytical point of view, attempts (elaborated in the 
early 1980s) “to re-centre the discipline look more like exercises in theoretical recidivism than 
renewal,” as John Holmwood suggested (John HOLMWOOD, “Abject " eory.” Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol. 32, 1996, no. 2, p. 96 [87–108]), they furnished the 
interpretative and summarizing activities of social theorists with new material and also with 
a sense of continuity. 
17  For an overview of these approaches and their relevance for theoretical thinking in the 
social sciences, see Radim HLADÍK, “A " eory’s Travelogue: Post-Colonial " eory in Post-
Socialist Space.” Teorie vědy/! eory of Science, vol. 33, 2011, no. 4, pp. 561–590. 
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to be achieved not by means of theoretical argument or disciplinary research 
practices but by means of “narratives.” As Steven Seidman, one of the most 
passionate advocates of the “new” approaches, argued in his famous article, 
postmodern social theory would replace established disciplinary styles of 
producing socially relevant knowledge, which from now on should take the 
form of “social narratives with a moral intent,” as “postmodern social analy-
ses amount to stories about society that carry moral, social, ideological, and 
perhaps directly political signi" cance.”18 And, as Seidman concludes:
Postmodernist narratives would be well advised to discard the con" guration of 
core modernist concepts such as progress, domination, liberation, and human-
ity. # e basic postmodern concepts will revolve around the notion of a self with 
multiple identities and group a$  liations, which is entangled in heterogeneous 
struggles with multiple possibilities for empowerment. Finally, postmodern 
narratives would acknowledge their practical-moral signi" cance. Moral analy-
sis would become a part of an elaborated social reason. # eorists would become 
advocates, abandoning the increasingly cynical, unbelievable guise of objective, 
value-neutral scientists. We would become advocates but not narrow partisans 
or activists. Our broader social signi" cance would lie in encouraging unen-
cumbered open public moral and social debate and in deepening the notion of 
public discourse. We would be a catalyst for the public to think seriously about 
moral and social concerns.19
Such arguments intensi" ed the already established obsession of social theo-
rists with their public relevance and indicated in which direction the debates 
on a desirable style of writing social theory would go. # e conceptual cha-
risma appeared to have dissipated,20 de" nitely in case of such concepts as
action, structure, order or society in their universalizing form. # e same 
holds true for basic criteria assessing the adequacy of making social theories, 
such as logical coherence or empirical correspondence.
However, as the enthusiastic rhetoric has evaporated from social theory’s 
programmatic texts in the last decade or so,21 it is more and more apparent 
18  Steven SEIDMAN, “# e End of Sociological # eory: # e Postmodern Hope.” Sociological 
! eory, vol. 9, 1991, no. 2, p. 142 (131–144).
19 Ibid., p. 144.
20  See Murray S. DAVIS, “Aphorisms and Clichés: # e Generation and Dissipation of 
Conceptual Charisma.” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 25, 1999, no. 1, pp. 245–269.
21 It may be added that such a concept of social theory based on the arbitrary identification of 
morally and politically relevant problems would ultimately lead to the evaporation of the very 
substance of social theory, as it has been historically formed, and to the institutional dissolu-
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that, apart from incorporating new ! gures, ideas, concepts or references, 
the practice of writing social theory is still largely reliant on commentary 
that organizes social theory’s agenda in customary ways. Taken generally, as 
regards writing social theory, it must be admitted that it has not overcome 
its most rampant form of being an exercise in the systematic treatment of 
the phenomena under study rather than a genuine problem-solving activity. 
Whether unfolded in an essayistic fashion, or in a more rigorously academic 
form, social theory has not developed any standard style of writing that does 
not proceed from individual capabilities to comment on some past achieve-
ments. In a  similar vein this is rea#  rmed by the fact that social theory 
seems to be at its best, at least judging from educational and commercial 
interests, when it recounts the story of the past in as comprehensive form as 
possible, with a promise to shed light on some past actions and to mediate 
inspiration for some future actions. $ e inclusive character of social theory 
and the accompanying heterogeneity of both its theoretical interests and 
its styles of writing probably re% ect the fact that social theory is aimed at 
diverse audiences. $ e loss of a “general paradigmatic style for organizing 
research”22 in the social sciences is particularly acute in the case of chroni-
cally unrestricted areas of inquiry mixing various disciplinary approaches 
and agendas with their own historically formed established style of reading, 
writing and thinking. Social theory is undoubtedly one of the best exemples 
of such areas of study. As there seems to be no standard form or style of 
“making” social theory apart from commentary, it may be the case that so-
cial theory will develop more in accord with literary methods than with the 
disciplines that historically provided social theory with its research material, 
such as sociology, political science, anthropology, etc. $ e coexistence of 
more rigid forms of theoretical argument, striving to uncover the continuity 
of theoretical research programs, with unrestrained essayistic or morally 
committed forms of social inquiry, under the “social theory” label, suggests 
that the ideas, images or visions of standard theoretical work may only be 
tion of this field of research as such. $ e resulting uncertainty concerning the basic means 
and ends of social theory, together with a hyper-tolerance towards the delineation of social 
theory’s agenda, would inevitably lead to the identification of relevant problems only on the 
basis of individual choice, inspiration, creativity, or imagination on the side of social theory’s 
practitioners, which is something signi! cantly inconsistent with preceding styles of making 
social theory that wished to impose limitations on its research practices.
22  See George E. MARCUS – Michael M. J. FISCHER, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An 
Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986, p. 8.
It is of course issuable whether there ever was any general paradigmatic style in the social 
sciences.
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illusions spread by self-sustaining interests. In such a case, “making” social 
theory might " nally come to terms with one of its avowed ends: “making” 
social theory means keeping it alive.
Jan Balon
